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  SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS:  
FACEBOOK’S “FRIEND SUGGESTION” ALGORITHM, 
SECTION 230 IMMUNITY, MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR 
TERRORISTS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
By Ellen Smith Yost1 
Victims of international terrorism have recently argued that 
Facebook incurs civil liability under the material support provisions of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) when its “friend suggestion” computer 
algorithm mines user data, identifies radicalized users with an interest 
in terrorism, and suggests that these users become “friends” with 
terrorist groups like Hamas that communicate over the platform. 
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (Section 230), 
social media companies like Facebook are currently immune from most 
“material support to terrorists” claims. But material support claims 
based on Facebook’s algorithms are novel and different. This article 
considers, for the first time, the statutory and constitutional hurdles 
facing plaintiffs bringing algorithmic material support claims. Section 
230 reform is currently the subject of intense regulatory and legislative 
interest. A terrorism carve-out is one proposed reform. For this reason, 
it is increasingly important for social media companies, litigants, 
courts, and Congress to understand the intersecting statutory and 
constitutional issues presented by algorithmic material support claims. 
First, such plaintiffs face the statutory hurdle posed by Section 
230. Currently, circuits are split on the existence and scope of
immunity granted by Section 230. The limited “definitional”
interpretation of § 230(c)(1) favored by the Seventh Circuit, unlike the
broad “immunity” approach currently favored by many circuits,
appropriately balances the competing policy concerns reflected in
Section 230 and in statutes like the ATA. The definitional approach to
Section 230 does not bar algorithmic material support claims against
social media platforms. Next, plaintiffs face a statutory hurdle posed
by the ATA’s proximate causation requirement. Social media
companies that worry about a flood of material support claims if
Section 230 immunity is scaled back by Congress or the courts should
find this hurdle’s presence reassuring. The ATA’s proximate cause
requirement will bar all but the strongest, most meritorious
algorithmic material support claims—an outcome that is fair to
1 JD Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2021. The author would like to 
express her gratitude to Jeffrey Kahn, Altshuler Distinguished Teaching 
Professor and Professor of Law at SMU Dedman School of Law, for his 
support and comments on a draft of this article. Any errors are the author’s 
alone. 
plaintiffs and to social media companies. Finally, if algorithmic 
material support claims are not statutorily barred, they are likely 
barred by the First Amendment. As the work of First Amendment 
scholar Stuart Minor Benjamin suggests, Facebook’s friend suggestion 
algorithm is likely to be protected speech. Under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the civil provisions 
of the Anti-Terrorism Act therefore could not be constitutionally 
applied to this algorithmic speech, no matter how meritorious the 
claim.  
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INTRODUCTION: FORCE V. FACEBOOK 
A client tells you her tragic story.2 A U.S. citizen, she lives in 
Israel. One terrible day, as she disembarked at a Jerusalem rail station 
with her three-month-old daughter, a member of the Palestinian 
terrorist group Hamas rammed his vehicle into the crowd, violently 
striking the baby’s stroller and its helpless occupant. The baby died two 
hours later. Seeking justice and compensation for your client, you 
consider who might bear civil liability under U.S. law for this heinous 
attack. The attacker himself was killed and had, in any case, no money. 
You can sue Hamas under the civil damages provision of the Anti-
Terrorism Act (ATA).3 But collecting damages from a foreign terrorist 
group is difficult to impossible.4 Fortunately, your client can also assert 
civil claims under the ATA against any U.S. entity that has provided 
material support to Hamas.5 The social media company Facebook 
arguably provides such support and is a tempting target.6 Of course, 
you need to understand your likelihood of success on such a claim. To 
do this, you must answer these questions: Is Facebook potentially liable 
to victims of terrorism, under the statute criminalizing material support 
to terrorists, when the company’s algorithms enable the responsible 
terrorist group’s actions by introducing it to potential new members? 
Or is the company exempt from liability under either Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) or the First 
Amendment?  
 
2 Sadly, this hypothetical scenario is based on the tragic death of Chaya Zissel 
Braun. Braun’s family were among the plaintiffs in Force v. Facebook, Inc., 
934 F.3d 53, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2019). 
3 See, e.g., Rubin v. Hamas-Islamic Resistance Movement, No. CIV. A. 02-
0975 (RMU), 2004 WL 2216489, at *4 (D.D.C. 2004) (granting default 
judgement and damages to victims of Hamas terrorist attack). Our 
hypothetical attorney can also sue state sponsors of Hamas’ terrorism under § 
1605A of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). See also Braun v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F. Supp. 3d 64, 87 (D.D.C. 2017) (ordering Iran 
and Syria to pay $178,500,000 in damages to the family of Chaya Zissel 
Braun).  
4 See, e.g., Mica Rosenberg, Suing Governments over Terror no Sure Thing 




5 See, e.g., Force, 934 F.3d at 61. 
6 See id.  
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The Supreme Court recently declined an opportunity to 
address these questions in Force v. Facebook.7 This was a mistake. The 
questions above implicate some of the most important legal and social 
issues facing U.S. society today, like how to balance free speech, 
liability, and harm in online forums; and how legal structures can 
provide incentive for internet companies to safeguard users and third 
parties while ensuring these companies have freedom to innovate and 
thrive in a competitive global marketplace. For this reason, the Court 
should take its earliest opportunity to decide the scope of Section 230 
and its relationship to the Anti-Terrorism Act and other statutes. This 
article tackles the questions the Court should have answered in Force. 
As Section 230 is currently the subject of intense regulatory, 
legislative, and scholarly interest, and a terrorism carve-out is one of 
several recently proposed reforms to Section 230, it is increasingly 
important that litigants, courts, and Congress understand these 
interrelated issues.8 
In Force, U.S. citizens who lost loved ones in Hamas terrorist 
attacks sought civil damages from Facebook, which they claimed 
unlawfully provided material support to a designated foreign terrorist 
organization and its murderous members.9 The Force plaintiffs based 
their claims on provisions of the ATA found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333, 
2339A, and 2339B.10 The Second Circuit rejected these claims, 
granting Facebook’s Motion to Dismiss and finding that Facebook was 
immunized from such suits under Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA.11 
Section 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider,” which 
courts including the Second Circuit interpret as providing companies 
like Facebook immunity from many civil claims.12  
 
7 Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
2761 (2020) (mem.).  
8 See infra notes 236, 237, 238 and accompanying text. 
9 See Force, 934 F.3d at 57. 
10 See infra Section II. C. notes and accompanying text.  
11 See Force, 934 F.3d at 57; 47 U.S.C. § 230; The “Communications Decency 
Act,” was enacted in 1996. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-104, tit. V, § 509, 110 Stat. 137, 138–39 (1996); see generally JEFF 
KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019). 
12 See, e.g., Force, 934 F.3d at 63–64; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). However, 
§ 230 provides no defense to criminal liability under the ATA. 47 U.S.C. § 
230(e)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the 
enforcement of . . .  any other Federal criminal statute.”). So, the government 
 
306 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 37 
So far as the Second Circuit’s decision applies Section 230 to 
civil material support claims based on social media content posted by 
Hamas or its members, the result is uncontroversial.13 However, the 
Force plaintiffs also brought novel claims based on Facebook’s “friend 
suggestion” algorithm.14 This algorithm is a proprietary computer 
program, developed by Facebook’s coders, that generates notifications 
suggesting users “friend” other selected users, based upon users’ 
shared interests (as identified by Facebook) and other factors.15 And as 
Chief Judge Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit argued in a partial 
dissent to the Force opinion, § 230(c)(1) arguably does not immunize 
Facebook from these claims, since the relevant content generated by 
this algorithm was not “provided by another user” as the statute 
requires, but created by Facebook itself.16  
Facebook, Judge Katzmann argued, could be liable under § 
230(c)(1) for suits based on the site’s algorithmically generated 
content—the “friend suggestions”—if the algorithm, as the Force 
plaintiffs claimed, mines user activity on the site, analyzes data points 
like users’ “likes” and clicks, and then “suggests” friends and other 
content a user might enjoy.17 The algorithm identifies people with 
terror-related interests and suggests they become friends with existing 
Hamas members, essentially sending Hamas eager new recruits.18 
 
would not be similarly barred by § 230(c)(1) from bringing criminal material 
support charges against Facebook. 
13 See, e.g., Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 3d 564, 568 (E.D. Mich. 
2018), aff'd, 921 F.3d 617, 627 (6th Cir. 2019). See also KOSSEFF, supra note 
11, at 228–38 (discussing Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016), aff’d 881 F.3d 739, 750 (9th Cir. 2018). As Kosseff notes, the 
district court in Fields held that the CDA barred the plaintiffs’ material support 
claims. The Ninth Circuit, however, declined to reach the CDA question, 
instead affirming the lower court’s dismissal for lack of proximate cause.    
14 See Force, 934 F.3d at 77 (J. Katzmann, dissenting).  
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 In the past, Facebook has closely guarded the details of its proprietary 
algorithms’ actual function. See Will Oremus, Who Controls Your Facebook 
Feed, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover_story/2016/01/how_faceboo
k_s_news_feed_algorithm_works.html (2016 article discussing the secret 
nature of Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm; the Force plaintiffs brought 
claims based on incidents in 2014 and 2016.).  Since the Force plaintiffs’ 
claims were dismissed prior to discovery, their allegations as to the friend 
suggestion algorithm’s function at the time remain untested. See Force, 934 
F.3d at 61–62. This article accepts the Force plaintiffs’ allegations for 
purposes of discussion only.  
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Facebook, the Force plaintiffs said, knows that its algorithmic 
programming choices cause this result, yet has failed to adjust the 
algorithm to eliminate the recruitment effect.19 This, they claimed, is 
providing support to international terrorists as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2239A or 2239B.20 By violating the material support provisions, 
Facebook becomes liable under the ATA’s civil cause of action, found 
at 18 U.S.C. § 2333.21 
This novel algorithmic argument leads to a novel issue: the 
constitutionality of the ATA’s material support provisions as applied 
to Facebook’s algorithm. Because courts have previously resolved all 
civil material support claims against social media companies like 
Facebook on statutory grounds under either Section 230 or § 2333, no 
court has yet addressed the question of whether §§ 2339A, 2339B, and 
2333 could be permissibly applied to an algorithm like this, which may 
be “speech” protected by the First Amendment.22 Only if the statute’s 
civil cause of action and the underlying criminal provisions, as applied 
to this algorithm, are constitutional will plaintiffs like those in Force 
realize an opportunity to seek relief on the merits.23   
In sum, victims of international terrorism bringing civil 
material support claims against social media companies like Facebook 
must clear two preliminary hurdles, which this article examines. First, 
there is a question of statutory immunity under § 230(c)(1) of the 
Communications Decency Act.24 This is the question addressed in 
Force. Second, there is a question of whether the First Amendment 
prevents Congress from regulating the algorithm at issue.25   
 
19 See Force, 934 F.3d at 77 (J. Katzmann, dissenting). 
20 Id. at 61 (plaintiff’s claims under §2333); see infra note 21 (describing the 
relationship between §2333 and §2339A and B). 
21 Plaintiffs (like those in Force) bringing material support-theory claims 
against U.S. companies under § 2333’s JASTA-added secondary liability 
provisions must essentially step into the shoes of the government and prove 
that the company is guilty of violating § 2339A or § 2339B. Once such a 
violation is established, it serves as the basis for and supplies the mens rea 
required by § 2333. See Maryam Jamshidi How the War on Terror Is 
Transforming Private U.S. Law, 96 WASH. U.L. REV. 559, 576–91 (2018) 
(listing cases proceeding on this theory and explaining the relationship 
between § 2333 and § 2339A–B in detail). 
22 See Crosby, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 568; see also Retana v. Twitter, Inc., 419 F. 
Supp. 3d 989, 989–95 (N.D. Tex. 2019). On the threshold question of whether 
Facebook’s algorithmic question is “speech” protected by the First 
Amendment and, if so, how robustly, see infra Section III.   
23 See infra Section II.C. (discussing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project). 
24 See Force, 934 F.3d 53 at 61; see infra Section I.C. 
25 See infra Section II. 
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Assuming for purposes of this analysis that the claims raised 
in Force about the operation and effect of Facebook’s friend suggestion 
algorithm are true, this article first considers statutory hurdles. It argues 
that the text and purpose of § 230(c)(1) and (2) together reflect 
Congress’ desire to protect companies from defamation-type suits, 
encouraging them to engage in content filtering and removal. To reflect 
this purpose, the Court should adopt a limited “definitional” 
interpretation of § 230(c)(1), favored by the Seventh Circuit.26 This 
article rejects the broad “immunity” approach favored by many circuits 
as unsupported by the text of the statute, in structural and historical 
context, and as granting overbroad protection. The definitional 
approach to § 230(c)(1) does not bar algorithmic material support 
claims like those raised by the Force plaintiffs.27 Though companies 
like Facebook would no doubt prefer a total immunity interpretation, 
they need not fear unfair ruinous liability under the material support 
statute’s civil provisions, the Anti-Terrorism Act’s proximate cause 
requirement will still bar all but the most meritorious claims. 28  
Next, this article examines the constitutional hurdle. First, it 
considers whether Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm is 
constitutionally protected speech. Applying the work of First 
Amendment scholar Stuart Minor Benjamin, it concludes that this 
algorithm is constitutionally protected speech, because (1) Facebook’s 
programmers, at the direction of its CEO, direct this algorithm to find 
and prioritize certain user data, which it analyzes to create new 
content—the friend suggestions, and (2) the algorithm communicates 
Facebook’s message that increased social interaction is desirable.29 
Finally, it considers whether the material support statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to civil claims based on Facebook’s 
algorithms. Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project to the facts alleged in Force, it concludes 
that the ATA’s civil liability provision cannot constitutionally be 
applied to Facebook’s algorithmic speech.30 The article concludes by 
considering potential reforms to Section 230, including a proposed 
terrorism carve out. This would prevent Section 230 from being used 
as a defense to liability under the ATA, raising the constitutional issue 
this article identifies. 
 
26 See infra Section I.B. 
27 See infra Section I.C.  
28 See infra Section I.C.  
29 See infra Section II.A. 
30 See infra Section II.C. 
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I. THE STATUTORY HURDLES: CDA SECTION 230, THE ATA, 
AND FACEBOOK’S “FRIEND SUGGESTION” ALGORITHM  
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 
1996 is the first hurdle plaintiffs like those in Force must clear.31 In 
their petition for cert, the Force plaintiffs asked the Court to resolve a 
circuit split regarding the type and scope of immunity granted to social 
media platforms under § 230(c)(1).32 Under the broadest form of the 
majority “immunity” approach (employed in Force by the Second 
Circuit), any civil claim against Facebook that is even indirectly based 
on user content is barred.33 This includes the Force plaintiffs’ 
algorithm-based claims. Alternatively, if the Court adopts the minority 
“definitional” approach to § 230(c)(1), which holds that this subsection 
merely blocks treating an internet content provider as a “speaker or 
publisher,” their claims would not be barred.34 This approach is taken 
by the Seventh Circuit.35 This part of the article will examine this 
circuit split in detail after taking a closer look at the statutory language 
itself and the legislative history. It recommends the definitional 
approach preferred by the Seventh Circuit as the better view but also 
examines whether, under the Second Circuit’s immunity approach, the 
Force plaintiffs’ claims are necessarily barred. 
 
31 See Force, 934 F.3d at 61. 
32 Cf. the “immunity approach” circuits: See Force, 934 F.3d at 53; Jane Doe 
No. 1 v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 18–20 (1st Cir. 2016); Green v. Am. 
Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 
129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 
418 (5th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 
406–10 (6th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010); 
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157, 1176–88 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Silver v. Quora, Inc., 666 Fed. 
App’x 727, 728–29 (10th Cir. 2016); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 
1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006) (with the “definitional approach” articulated in 
Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 
461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 693–98 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Chicago 
Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 
666, 669–72 (7th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit, however, is moving closer to 
the definitional approach. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–
01 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
33 See infra Section II.A.; see also Force, 934 F.3d at 64. A petition for panel 
rehearing or, alternatively, rehearing en banc was denied. Order, Force, No. 
18-397, 2019 at 2–3 (2d Cir. 2019). As noted previously, § 230 does not 
immunize Facebook from criminal liability under §§ 2339A–B. See 47 U.S.C. 
230(e)(1).  
34 Force, 934 F.3d at 62.  
35 See Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693–98. 
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A. The CDA and the ATA: two statutes with diverging 
purposes 
Considering the legislative history and purpose of the ATA and 
the CDA helps us understand whether, how, and why the CDA might 
exempt Facebook from civil liability under the ATA. The legislative 
history of the ATA reflects Congress’ effort to expand ways to hold 
terrorists and their supporters liable.36 The legislative history of the 
CDA reflects Congress’ desire to protect two distinct constituencies: 
internet users and internet companies.37 The claim at issue in Force 
thus presents an interpretive dilemma. Expansive interpretation of the 
ATA raises liability for internet companies whom the CDA seeks to 
protect, while expansive interpretation of the CDA deprives 
sympathetic terror victims of a potentially powerful cause of action.  
The ATA, found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339, provides civil and 
criminal causes of action against foreign terrorists. Section 2333, the 
civil cause of action for victims of terrorist acts, dates to 1992.38 
Section 2239A, which criminalizes providing material support in aid 
of terrorist attacks, was added in 1994.39 Section 2239B, which 
similarly criminalizes providing material support to a designated 
foreign terrorist organization, was added in 1996.40 By the same 
legislation in 1996, Congress also amended and enlarged Section 
2339A.41 In 2016, Congress amended and broadened § 2333 through 
the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA).42 JASTA, the 
purpose of which was to “provide civil litigants with the broadest 
possible basis . . . to seek relief against [material supporters of 
terrorism],” added secondary liability for civil aiding and abetting, and 
for civil conspiracy, to § 2333.43  
Most recently, Congress amended §§ 2331 and 2333 in 2018’s 
Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA), limiting exclusions from 
liability under the ATCA and expanding the ATCA’s civil remedies 
 
36 See infra notes 39–48 and accompanying text (describing Congressional 
actions expanding the ATA’s causes of action). 
37 See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
38 See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 
1003, 106 Stat. 4506, 4522. 
39 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, § 120005, 108 Stat. 2022. 
40 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, § 303, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (1996). 
41 See id. § 323. 
42 See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), Pub. L. 114-222, 
§ 2(b), 130 Stat. 852, 853 (2016). 
43 Id. 
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and jurisdiction.44 ATCA, like JASTA, was intended to help plaintiffs 
recover for injuries suffered at the hands of terrorists.45 ATCA’s 
amendments applied not just prospectively but to “any civil action 
pending on . . . the date of the enactment of this Act.”46 This unusual 
provision was the result of “active advocacy effort by plaintiffs who 
had received adverse decisions in existing terrorism-related civil 
litigation” and was “primarily intended to revive those plaintiffs’ 
cases.”47 Thus, the recent history of the ATA reflects Congress’ desire 
to increase terror victims’ access to civil remedies. However, this intent 
to expand the statute’s reach does not explicitly overrule the CDA. 48 
Notably, the pending terrorism-based civil claims Congress revived by 
ATCA did not include terrorism-based civil material support cases 
against social media companies, though several such claims had been 
filed and dismissed under the CDA by that time, as Congress was 
surely aware.49   
The CDA, now found at 47 U.S.C § 230, was enacted in 1996 
as the internet first began to touch many Americans’ lives.50 As 
enacted, the CDA was comprised of two sections: § 223 and § 230.51 
Section 223, which courts swiftly deemed an unconstitutional 
restriction on users’ First Amendment-protected rights, created 
protections to shield minor users from obscene or harassing content and 
 
44 See Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA), Pub. L. 115-253, § 2(a), 132 
Stat. 3183 (2018). 
45 See H.R. REP. NO. 115-858, at 2 (2018). 
46 ATCA, Pub. L. 115-253, §§ 2(b), 3(b), 132 Stat. 3183 (2018). 
47 See Harry Graver & Scott R. Anderson, Shedding Light on the Anti-
Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018, LAWFARE (Oct. 25, 2018, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/shedding-light-anti-terrorism-clarification-act-
2018.  
48 The Second Circuit rejected the Force plaintiffs’ claim that the 2016 JASTA 
amendments to § 2339A and § 2339B implicitly repealed § 230(c)(1). Force, 
934 F.3d at 72 (“JASTA merely expanded Section 2333's cause of action to 
secondary liability; it provides no obstacle—explicit or implicit—to applying 
Section 230.”). 
49 See Graver & Anderson, supra note 47; see also Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 303 
F. Supp. 3d 564, 568 (E.D. Mich. 2018), aff'd, 921 F.3d 617, 622 (6th Cir. 
2019); Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874, 887 (N.D. Cal. 2017); 
Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 
881 F.3d 739, 749–50 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal on proximate 
causation without reaching the CDA issue).  
50 See generally KOSSEFF, supra note 11. 
51 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 § 
501-09. 
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penalize internet providers for knowingly transmitting it.52 According 
to its author, Senator James Exon, § 223’s purpose was to make sure 
the “information superhighway” did not become a “red light district” 
where children would be accosted with “inappropriate 
communications” or citizens menaced by “uninvited indecencies.”53   
Section 230 was introduced as the “Online Family 
Empowerment” amendment to Senator Exon’s legislation, by 
Representatives Chris Cox and Ron Wyden, who feared Exon’s CDA 
would stifle online freedom and technological innovation.54 It was a 
direct response to a court decision that had shaken the nascent internet 
industry, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Company.55 In 
Stratton Oakmont, the internet company Prodigy was held liable as a 
“publisher” of defamatory statements posted by a user on its chat 
board.56 Ironically, Prodigy’s efforts to screen and remove such 
offensive content had exposed it to this liability.57 As a factually similar 
case had recently found, an internet service provider could not be held 
liable as a publisher when it took no steps to police content on its chat 
boards.58 Stratton Oakmont provided a strong disincentive for 
companies to establish and enforce content standards.59 
 
52 See id. § 502; see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct. 
2329, 2329-30, 2340 (1997) (affirming lower court order enjoining the 
Government from enforcing the criminal provisions of § 223(a) and (d)).  
53 141 Cong. Rec.  S1953 (July 16, 1996); Robert Cannon, The Legislative 
History of Senator Exon's Communications Decency Act: Regulating 
Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. at *53 
(1996). 
54 See 141 Cong. Rec. H8468-69 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). See also KOSSEFF, 
supra note 11, at 59–76. 
55 See 141 Cong. Rec. H8468-69 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (Cox stated, 
“Ironically, the existing legal system provides a massive disincentive for the 
people who might best help us control the Internet to do so,” and comparing 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 
323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), with Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, 
Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-
458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific purposes of this section 
is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions 
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of 
content that is not their own because they have restricted access to 
objectionable material.”); see also KOSSEFF, supra note 11, at 45–56. 
56 See supra note 55.  
57 See supra note 55.  
58 See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140. 
59 See supra note 55.  
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Beyond overruling Stratton Oakmont, Cox and Wyden’s 
amendment had two purposes.60 It aimed to “promote the continued 
development of the internet” by safeguarding the industry from 
burdensome state and federal regulation.61 It also aimed to maximize 
users’ control over what information they—and their children—
received via the internet.62 These purposes supported each other. Only 
if companies were free to innovate and satisfy diverse user preferences 
for “safe” (or unsafe) content would the internet continue to flourish, 
and only if companies were willing to provide such screening could 
users be effectively protected.63 To this end, § 230(c), the operable 
portion of § 230, is titled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking 
and screening of offensive material” and is comprised of two 
subsections.64 The first, § 230(c)(1), “Treatment of publisher or 
speaker,” states in full that: “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”65 The 
second, § 230(c)(2), “Civil liability,” provides that “[n]o provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account 
of” their voluntary good faith actions “to restrict access to or 
availability of” material the provider considers “objectionable,”66 or 
their voluntary provision or enabling of content blocking or screening 
technologies.67 Section 230 specifically excludes certain laws from its 
scope, notably intellectual property laws, criminal laws, and the 
 
60 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 See 141 Cong. Rec. H8468-69 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (Remarks of Rep. 
Cox: “Some have suggested . . . that we hire even more bureaucrats and more 
regulators who will attempt, either civilly or criminally, to punish people by 
catching them in the act of putting something into cyberspace. Frankly, there 
is just too much going on on the Internet for that to be effective. No matter 
how big the army of bureaucrats, it is not going to protect my kids because I 
do not think the Federal Government will get there in time . . . [we need] 
something that actually works.”). 
64 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
65 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
66 This includes material that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).  
67 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). 
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provisions of (invalidated) § 223.68 The ATA’s civil cause of action is 
not among these exclusions.69 
Section 230(c)(1) is the provision at issue in Force. It confers 
protection from civil suits when three criteria are met.70 First, the 
defendant must be a provider of an interactive computer service.71 
Second, the claims must be based upon information provided by 
another information content provider.72 And third, the service provider 
must be being treated as the publisher or speaker of the information at 
issue.73 Courts are split, however, on the scope and type of protection 
that § 230(c)(1) provides.74 Some courts hold it confers broad immunity 
and use an expansive concept of “publication,” while others hold it 
confers only limited immunity or functions as a “definitional” carve 
out for publication-based torts like defamation.75 This section 
recommends the Court resolve this circuit split by adopting the Seventh 
Circuit’s definitional approach to § 230(c)(1), as this limited approach 
provides appropriate protection for internet companies and respects the 
bounds of the CDA, as written. It then considers whether, under this or 
the majority immunity interpretation, § 230(c)(1) properly bars claims 
like those at issue in Force. 
B. Resolving the current circuit split about what protection § 
230(c)(1) grants to internet communication service 
providers like Facebook 
Courts consistently find that Facebook is a provider of an 
interactive computer service potentially covered by § 230(c)(1).76 But 
courts are split on the scope and type of protection § 230(c)(1) grants 
 
68 47 U.S.C. § 230(e). 
69 See id. The Second Circuit rejected the Force plaintiffs’ claims that because 
§ 230 does not apply to criminal provisions, and § 2333 depends upon proving 
the underlying criminal violations in §§ 2339A or B, the CDA did not apply 
to their claims under § 2333. Force, 934 F.3d at 71.  
70 See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 
398, 409 (3rd Cir. 2014).  
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Cf. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997), with 
Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Rights Under Civil Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008). 
75 See supra note 74. 
76 See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355–60 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 
see also Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1093 
(N.D. Cal. 2015), aff'd, 697 F. App'x 526 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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to service providers like Facebook.77 A majority of courts hold that § 
230(c)(1) gives internet providers immunity from any claim based on 
the activity of “publishing” third-party content.78 Some courts consider 
this immunity broad, covering any civil claim based on the service’s 
making information provided by a user available to others.79 Other 
courts limit this immunity to claims based on a service’s “exercise of 
traditional editorial functions.”80 Still others find that § 230(c)(1) 
defines limits on application of “publisher” liability.81 
The immunity approach was established in Zeran v. America 
Online (AOL).82 Zeran involved malicious anonymous posts made to 
AOL’s online “bulletin board.”83 The posts, made just a week after the 
1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City, advertised the sale of t-shirts bearing horribly “offensive and 
tasteless slogans” related to the attack.84 Users were urged to call Ken 
Zeran to purchase these shirts.85 After the unsuspecting and innocent 
Zeran was deluged with irate calls and threats, he reported the hoax 
posts to AOL.86 Zeran repeatedly requested that AOL remove the posts, 
block the anonymous poster, and post a retraction. When his pleas went 
unanswered, he sued AOL for negligence and defamation.87 AOL 
raised § 230 as a defense and moved for judgment on the pleadings, 
which the trial court granted.88  
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion affirming the lower court’s 
decision made several bold assertions about § 230. First, the court 
stated, the “plain language” of § 230(c)(1) where “‘[n]o provider or 
 
77 See supra note 74. 
78 See Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 12; see Force, 934 F.3d at 53; see Green v. 
America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d at 465; see Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31; see 
MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 413; see Jones, 735 F.3d at 406–07; see Johnson, 
614 F.3d at 785; see Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1157; see Silver, 666 
Fed. App’x at 727; see Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1316; Marshall’s Locksmith 
Serv. Inc., v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2019).   
79 See Force, 934 F.3d at 64; see MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 418; see Jones, 
755 F.3d at 406–07. 
80 See Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 18; see Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101 (finding § 
230 applied to a non-publication-based tort where the cause was essentially 
defamation, recast, and applying a “publication”-type analysis). 
81 See City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010). 
82 See Zeran,129 F.3d at 330.  
83 See id.  
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 At one point, “Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call approximately 
every two minutes.” Id. at 329. 
87 Id. at 328. 
88 See Zeran,129 F.3d at 329–30. 
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user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider . . . creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that 
would make service providers liable for information originating with a 
third-party user of the service.”89 Specifically, it stated, this bars 
“lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a 
publisher's traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to 
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.”90 Next, though it had 
declared the language “plain,” the court considered the legislative 
intent behind § 230.91 Focusing on § 230’s internet service provider-
protective purpose (while barely mentioning its customer-protective 
purpose) the court announced that § 230(c) should be interpreted 
“broadly,” in favor of immunity for companies.92 Applying this broad 
construction, the court held that AOL was immunized against the 
negligence and defamation claims.93 
Zeran’s dicta supports the broadest version of § 230(c)(1) 
immunity.94 In dicta, the court stated that the Congressional anti-
regulatory intent behind § 230(c) supported reading that provision as 
extending companies immunity to “tort.” 95 Congress, the Zeran court 
said, “recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of 
speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.”96 In enacting § 
230(c), Congress chose to deter harmful online content through 
“vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish 
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer,” and not “through the separate route of imposing tort 
liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties' 
potentially injurious messages.”97 Courts following a narrow immunity 
 
89 Id. at 330.     
90 Id. 
91 But see Caminetti v. United States, 37 S. Ct. 192, 194 (1917) (“Where the 
language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of 
interpretation does not arise” and courts should look only to the text.). 
92 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
93 Id. at 335.  
94 See Force, 934 F.3d at 53; see MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 418; see Jones, 
755 F.3d at 406–07; see Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1321; see Marshall’s Locksmith 
Serv., 925 F.3d at 1267. 
95 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31. 
96 Id. at 330 (emphasis added). 
97 Id. at 330–31 (citing § 230(b)(5)) (emphasis added).  
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approach, by contrast, look to Zeran’s more limited “traditional 
editorial functions” language.98  
On the other side of the split is the Seventh Circuit, which 
considers § 230(c)(1) a “definitional provision” that provides no 
immunity.99 Instead, the section “limits who may be called the 
publisher of information that appears online” and is a defense to 
liability under actions that depend upon status as a “publisher.” 100 A 
Chicago district court, declining to follow the by then well-established 
Zeran approach, articulated this approach in Chicago Lawyers' 
Committee For Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.101 
Chicago Lawyers involved a Fair Housing Act (FHA) challenge 
brought by a nonprofit group against Craigslist, an online classified ads 
site.102 The group sought a declaratory judgment that Craigslist, by 
accepting and displaying housing ads that expressed an impermissible 
preference for certain tenants, violated provisions of the FHA.103 The 
ads were posted by users through Craigslist’s submission portal.104 
Craigslist claimed § 230(c)(1) immunized it from FHA liability, since 
the discriminatory ad content was provided by users.105 “[T]en 
companies and trade associations affiliated with the online and 
electronic communications industries,” including Amazon, Google, 
and Yahoo!, filed a joint amicus brief urging the court to adopt 
Craigslist’s position.106  
The district court acknowledged that “[n]ear-unanimous case 
law [following Zeran] holds that Section 230(c) affords immunity to 
[internet companies] against suits that seek to hold [them] liable for 
third-party content.”107 However, the court respectfully disagreed with 
Zeran’s broad reading of § 230.108 “It is a fundamental canon of 
statutory construction,” the district court noted, “that the words of a 
 
98 See id. at 330; see also Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 12 (1st Cir. 2016); 
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101, as amended (Sept. 28, 2009) (finding § 230 applied 
to a non-publication-based tort where the cause was essentially defamation, 
recast, and applying a “publication”-type analysis). 
99 See StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d at 366. 
100 See id. 
101 Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 693 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d sub nom. 519 F.3d 666 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
102 Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 686. 
103 Id. at 685–87. 
104 Id. at 684–85. 
105 Id. at 687. 
106 Id. at 683–84. 
107 Id. at 688. 
108  Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693. 
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statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in 
the overall statutory scheme.”109 Bearing this in mind, “Section 
230(c)(1) does not bar ‘any cause of action,’ as Zeran holds and as 
Craigslist contends, but instead is more limited—it bars those causes 
of action that would require treating an [internet company] as a 
publisher of third-party content,” as its title and caption indicated.110 
“First and foremost,” the court explained, “Zeran overstates the ‘plain 
language’ of Section 230(c)(1).”111 The subsection’s text never 
mentioned “immunity.”112 And the Zeran court had itself indicated, 
before phrasing its holding in sweeping language, that the provision 
was limited to torts based on a provider’s publisher-like exercise of 
traditional editorial functions.113 Subsequent courts granting broad 
immunity reasoned based on Zeran’s interpretation, not § 230(c)(1)’s 
text, it noted.114 Moreover, the broad immunity approach gave 
companies no incentive to filter content, because they would be 
protected whether they did or didn’t police content and filtering would 
cost more than not filtering.115 So doing, the Zeran interpretation 
undercut the CDA’s second purpose—protecting users.116  
Rejecting Zeran’s approach, the district court held that Section 
230(c)(1) “does not grant immunity per se [but] does prohibit treatment 
as a publisher, which, quite plainly, would bar any cause of action that 
requires, to establish liability, a finding that [the company] published 
third-party content.”117 Because the FHA provision at issue made it 
illegal “[t]o make, print, or publish . . . any [discriminatory] notice, 
statement, or advertisement,” § 230(c)(1) did in fact apply and 
Craigslist could not be held liable as a publisher of the discriminatory 
 




113 Id. at 688–89 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330) (“Specifically, § 230 
precludes . . . lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise 
of a publisher's traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to 
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.”). 
114 Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 688–89; but see Barnes, 570 F.3d at 
1100 (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Roommates, 521 F.3d at 
1171 (9th Cir. 2008), and Barnes rested not on “broad statements of 
immunity” but on “careful exegesis”).  
115  Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 691. 
116 See id. 
117 Id. at 696. 
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housing ads.118 The Seventh Circuit affirmed this result and the court’s 
definitional approach.119  
Notwithstanding most circuits’ adoption of the immunity 
approach, the Court should resolve this circuit split by adopting the 
Seventh Circuit’s definitional interpretation of § 230(c)(1), which is the 
more faithful reading of this provision.120 As the persistent existence of 
this circuit split shows, the language of § 230(c)(1) is not plain but 
ambiguous.121 Therefore, the Court should consider the text in 
context.122 While powerful online communication companies no doubt 
prefer the majority approach (and could lobby for a statute that grants 
such broad immunity), the Seventh Circuit’s definitional approach is 
the better reading for three reasons. First, the text of § 230(c)(1) does 
not grant “immunity”—either broad or narrow.123 Second, the 
definitional approach functionally aligns § 230(c)(1) with § 230(c)(2) 
and accords with § 230(c)(1)’s title and caption.124 And third, the 
definitional approach more closely tracks Congress’ two stated 
purposes for § 230.125 
First, as the Seventh Circuit noted in Chicago Lawyers, the 
majority’s immunity approach grows out of an erroneous and 
overbroad reading of § 230 established in Zeran.126 Zeran claimed that 
§ 230, “[b]y its plain language . . . creates a federal immunity to any 
cause of action that would make service providers liable for 
information originating with a third-party user of the service.”127 But 
as the Seventh Circuit points out, § 230(c)(1) does not use the word 
“immunity” or words like “shall not be held liable for” that are 
 
118 Id. at 696–98. 
119 Id. at 667. 
120 The Ninth Circuit, while still using an immunity approach, narrowed its 
approach after Roommates.com and has adopted some of the language of the 
Seventh Circuit’s definitional approach. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100. 
121 See Graham City Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States. ex rel. 
Wilson, 125 S. Ct. 2444, 2451 n.2 (2005) (declaring a statute ambiguous 
“because its text, literally read, admits of two plausible interpretations”). 
122 See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 539–40 (2015).  
123 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see also Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 
693 (§ 230(c)(1) “does not mention ‘immunity’ or any similar term or phrase 
. . . [unlike § 230(c)(2)] which uses language that unequivocally creates 
immunity: ‘no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of . . .’”). 
124 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 
363, 365 (7th Cir. 2010). 
125 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
126 Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693. 
127 Zeran, F.3d at 330. 
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commonly understood to grant immunity.128 Section 230(c)(2), by 
contrast, does use traditional immunity-granting words, reading “no 
[provider]. . . shall be held liable on account of.”129 As the Court has 
noted, “where Congress includes particular language in one section of 
a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion.”130 So, if Congress intended § 
230(c)(1) to grant broad immunity in the manner of (c)(2), it likely 
would have used the same or similar words in each subsection.  
Second, as the Seventh Circuit emphasized in another case, 
City of Chicago v. StubHub!, the definitional approach, unlike the 
broad immunity approach, properly considers the provision’s full, 
contextualized purpose, as shown by its title and caption.131 The 
Supreme Court understands that, “[a]lthough section headings cannot 
limit the plain meaning of a statutory text, they supply cues as to what 
Congress intended.”132 Section 230 is titled “Protection for private 
blocking and screening of offensive material.”133 Subsection (c) is 
captioned “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of 
offensive material.”134 Because both headings reference “offensive 
material,” this strongly suggests they were intended to limit 
defamation-type, content-based claims, not all tort claims as the broad 
immunity approach holds. 135  
StubHub! drives home the vast over-applicability of the broad 
immunity approach. In StubHub!, an online ticket marketplace, 
StubHub!, claimed that § 230(c)(1) exempted it from having to collect 
and remit an amusement tax imposed by Chicago.136 StubHub! claimed 
that under § 230’s broad immunity it was exempted from collecting 
taxes on the ticket transactions it facilitated.137 Rejecting this 
interpretation, Judge Easterbrook noted that “Section 230's title, 
‘Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material’, 
does not suggest that it limits taxes that have nothing to do with 
 
128 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693.   
129 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); see Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693.   
130 Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1983). 
131 StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d at 365. 
132 Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883, 893 (2018); 
cf. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 539 (2015).  
133 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
134 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
135 As the legislative history of the CDA shows, the “offensive material” 
Congress was concerned with was online pornography, defamation, 
harassment, and disparagement. See supra notes 58–64, 66. 
136 StubHub!, 624 F.3d at 365. 
137 See id. 
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[offensive content].”138 Nor, he said, did “Subsection (c)'s caption, 
‘Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive 
material[.]’”139 Both the title and caption instead suggested Congress 
intended § 230(c)(1) to apply to publication-based claims like the 
disparagement and defamation claims at issue in Stratton Oakmont and 
Cubby.140 Zeran’s approach, he emphasized, potentially reaching even 
tax claims, far exceeded Congressional intent for § 230.141 And, as the 
district court had noted in Chicago Lawyers, the Zeran approach 
undermined the user protections Congress had intended to encourage, 
by eliminating financial incentive for companies to police their own 
content.142 
The narrow immunity approach addresses this latter concern 
by limiting immunity to cases involving the company’s engagement in 
traditional publisher-type activities like editing and 
promoting/removing material. But only the definitional approach hews 
to the text of § 230(c)(1) by not granting “immunity” Congress did not 
authorize. For this reason, even though the majority of circuits 
currently do otherwise, the Court should adopt a definitional approach 
to § 230(c)(1) and reject both the broad and narrow immunity 
approaches. 
C. Reconsidering whether § 230(c)(1) bars the Force 
plaintiffs’ algorithmic material support claims 
Of course, the Force plaintiffs did not seek cert merely to 
resolve this circuit split. They hoped for a finding that § 230(c)(1) does 
not bar material support claims based on Facebook’s friend suggestion 
algorithm.  
Under the Seventh Circuit’s definitional approach, these 
claims are not barred.143 The Force plaintiffs asserted claims based on 
three provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA): 18 U.S.C. § 
 
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 See id. at 365–66; see 141 CONG. REC. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) 
(Remarks of Rep. Cox, comparing Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. 
Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) with 
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
141 Cf. StubHub!, 624 F.3d at 366, with Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997). 
142 Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 693 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d sub nom. 519 F.3d 666 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
143 See StubHub!, 624 F.3d at 366. 
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2333(a), § 2339A, and § 2339B.144 Unlike a defamation claim or the 
FHA claims at issue in Chicago Lawyers, liability under these 
provisions does not depend on whether Facebook is a publisher.145 
Rather, “any person” (natural or corporate) who knowingly provides 
“material support or resources” to a prohibited person or organization 
is potentially liable.146  
The Force plaintiffs might also prevail if the Court adopts an 
immunity approach, under possible reasonings offered by Chief Judge 
Katzmann in his Force dissent.147 As the dissent notes, Facebook’s 
friend suggestion algorithm is arguably not “content provided by 
another internet content provider.”148 If that is so, the algorithm-based 
claims are not exempted under either the broad or narrow immunity 
approach. Alternatively, Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm may 
not perform a traditional “publishing” function, so under the narrow 
immunity approach the claims are not barred.149  
As Judge Katzmann first suggests, Facebook’s friend 
suggestions are not “information provided by another information 
content provider” and are thus completely outside § 230(c)’s scope.150 
The algorithms allegedly create new informational content from raw 
data about user activities.151 The Force majority rejected this view, 
using a “material contribution” test developed for defamation cases.152 
Under that test, because Facebook did not “directly and materially 
contribute to what made the content itself unlawful,” Facebook did not 
“develop” the content. It merely chose where to “present” Hamas’ 
content.153 Like a traditional editor making decisions about what to 
feature on the front page and what to bury inside, Facebook’s friend 
algorithm merely identified some profiles to place more prominently 
than the rest.154  
 
144 See Force, 934 F.3d at 61 n.10. Plaintiffs bringing civil claims under § 2333 
on a secondary liability material support theory must first step into the shoes 
of a prosecutor and show a violation of § 2339A or § 2339B, which violation 
serves as the basis of civil liability. See supra, note 21.  
145 See Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693. 
146 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (both providing that “whoever” provides 
material support as defined by the statute shall be punished under the statute). 
147 See Force, 934 F.3d at 77 (Katzman, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  
148 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see Force, 934 F.3d at 77. 
149 Force, 934 F.3d at 77. 
150 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
151 See Force, 934 F.3d at 77. 
152 See id. at 68–70.  
153 See id. at 68–69. 
154 See id. at 66–67.  
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But as the dissent rightly points out, if Facebook’s algorithm 
operates as the plaintiffs claim, it does not just present friend 
suggestions but creates these suggestions.155 Put another way, 
Facebook’s algorithm is not like Buzzfeed or another site that skims 
your blog posts and arranges completed content you posted elsewhere. 
It is like a researcher who pokes through your trashcan to uncover 
secret habits and patterns about your life—patterns you have not 
knowingly revealed and may not have yourself recognized—analyzes 
the resulting data, and sells your name in a database to purveyors of 
items your trash reveals you might want to purchase. Your trash isn’t 
the product this garbage-picking researcher is selling. And the database 
he has produced is not an altered or edited version of your trash. Its 
value lies in the synthesized product—new information which the 
researcher, not you, created. As this analogy shows, the Force dissent’s 
interpretation is correct. Facebook’s algorithms are content created by 
Facebook, not another user.156 Section 230 should be “irrelevant” to 
these claims.157 
As Judge Katzmann alternatively suggests, Facebook’s friend 
suggestion algorithm is outside the traditional understanding of what it 
means to “publish” another’s content.158 Section 230, he explains, 
“does not apply whenever a claim would treat the defendant as ‘a 
publisher’ in the abstract, immunizing defendants from liability 
stemming from any activity in which one thinks publishing companies 
commonly engage.”159 It applies when the service acts as “the 
publisher” of the specific content at issue by engaging in editorial 
functions like “deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or 
alter content” submitted by another.160 That is not the case with 
Facebook’s algorithm. To illustrate, imagine you are a published book 
author. Amazon, having tracked a customer’s past purchases, 
determines that customer would enjoy your latest book. It suggests the 
customer buy your book. Amazon, of course, is not the publisher or 
editor of your book. It’s making a sales connection. Following this 
logic, Facebook is not immune for suits based on an algorithm that 
performs not editorial but sales type functions.161 
 
155 See id. at 77 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
156 See id. at 82 (J. Katzmann, dissenting in part).  
157 See City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
158 See Force, 934 F.3d at 81 (J. Katzmann, dissenting in part). 
159 See id. at 80–81. 
160 Id. at 81. 
161 See id. at 82. 
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D. The ATA’s proximate causation requirement is the 
appropriate statutory hurdle by which to screen 
algorithmic material support claims 
Section 230 is not the only statutory hurdle lying between 
plaintiffs and recovery. The ATA itself presents a formidable hurdle 
for plaintiffs attempting to bring algorithmic material support claims 
against social media companies like Facebook.162  
The ATA’s private right of action is available to a United 
States national who has been injured “by reason of an act of 
international terrorism.”163 “By reason of” equates to proximate 
cause.164 Courts that have considered the ATA’s proximate causation 
requirement in material support claims have required “some direct 
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged.”165 While the directness of the relationship is only one aspect 
of a proximate cause analysis, it is a key requirement.166 A “tenuous” 
connection between the social media company’s algorithmic conduct 
and the terrorist act does not suffice.167 
Though no court has yet considered this issue, it will be very 
difficult for plaintiffs bringing algorithmic social media material 
support claims to meet this proximate cause standard.168 To survive 
dismissal for failure to state a claim under the ATA, a plaintiff would 
likely have to show that the algorithm-generated friend suggestion 
directly caused the terrorist actor to connect with a listed terrorist group 
and that the resulting online interaction proximately led to the specific 
action that injured the plaintiff.169 Most algorithmic material support 
cases would be unable to meet this standard, given the huge number of 
possible influences on any given terrorist actor and the minor weight 
of a single friend suggestion. Social media companies therefore need 
not fear wide exposure to expensive and intrusive discovery 
proceedings for material support claims not barred by Section 230.  
It is fair to social media companies that an algorithmic material 
support claim should have to clear the ATA’s significant proximate 
causation hurdle. But fairness also requires that victims of terror attacks 
 
162 See Retana v. Twitter, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 3d 989, 995 (N.D. Tex. 2019).   
163 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). 
164 See Retana, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 995. 
165 Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 624 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bridge 
v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654 (2008)); Retana, 419 F. 
Supp. 3d at 995. 
166 See Crosby, 921 F.3d at 624.  
167 See id.  
168 Cf. Crosby, 921 F.3d at 624 with Retana, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 995. 
169 Cf. Crosby, 921 F.3d at 624 with Retana, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 995. 
2021] SOCIAL SUPPORT  325 
pleading plausible material support claims against social media 
companies should not find those claims barred by the CDA. The ATA, 
not Section 230, is the appropriate statutory hurdle by which to screen 
out tenuous algorithmic material support claims.  
In conclusion, if the Court in future resolves the current circuit 
split by adopting the Seventh Circuit’s definitional approach, 
algorithmic material support claims like those brought by the Force 
plaintiffs would not be barred by § 230(c)(1). Or, the Court could adopt 
an immunity approach and accept one of Judge Katzmann’s arguments 
that the friend suggestion algorithm-based claims are not barred. Or 
finally, Congress could amend Section 230 to create a “carve-out” for 
terrorism claims, as has recently been proposed.170 Should any of these 
happen in a case where the plaintiffs can show proximate cause, lower 
courts must next determine whether the material support statute’s civil 
liability provision, as applied to Facebook’s friend suggestion 
algorithm, is constitutional. Assuming for argument’s sake algorithmic 
material support claims might someday pass the statutory hurdles 
posed by the CDA and the ATA, this article next analyzes the 
constitutional hurdle posed by the First Amendment. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLE: POTENTIAL FIRST 
AMENDMENT LIMITS ON MATERIAL SUPPORT LIABILITY 
BASED ON FACEBOOK’S FRIEND SUGGESTION ALGORITHM  
If the Supreme Court holds or Congress declares that Section 
230 does not bar claims based on Facebook’s algorithmic friend 
suggestions, plaintiffs like those in Force will next face a constitutional 
hurdle. Facebook will argue that its algorithm is constitutionally 
protected speech that the government seeks to impermissibly regulate. 
It will challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B, 
and 2333 as applied to this algorithm. This section considers these 
hypothetical arguments and finds them convincing. 
The First Amendment provides in relevant part that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”171 The 
“freedom of speech” thus guaranteed by the Constitution is 
expansive.172 It embraces discussion of “all issues about which 
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society 
to cope with the exigencies of their period.”173 In order to adequately 
protect valuable speech (and avoid the danger of allowing government 
to decide speech’s value) the Court has held that the First Amendment 
 
170 See infra Section II. 
171 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3. 
172 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957). 
173 Id. at 488. 
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protects such diverse “speech” as advertising, flag burning, video 
games, and data mining.174    
But the freedom of speech, while fundamental, is not 
absolute.175 Most speech is protected from abridgment, but “[t]here are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem.”176 These include incitement, true threats, 
obscenity, and “fighting words.”177 And even speech protected under 
the First Amendment may be regulated, under limited circumstances.178 
Different kinds of speech restrictions trigger differing levels of 
scrutiny: content-based regulations and regulations of political speech 
receive strict scrutiny, while commercial speech regulations, for 
example, receive less rigorous scrutiny.179 
Thus, a court considering whether claims like the ones in Force 
clear the constitutional hurdle must resolve three questions. First, is 
Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm “speech”? Second, assuming 
Facebook’s algorithm is indeed speech, what level of protection, if any, 
does the First Amendment provide it? And third, do §§ 2339A, 2339B, 
and 2333 permissibly regulate this “algorithmic speech”? This section 
addresses each of these questions, in turn.  
A. Is Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm “speech”?  
Both “the creation and dissemination of information are speech 
within the meaning of the First Amendment.”180 But applying this 
definition to information that is created and disseminated by machines 
rather than humans, at least in part, raises tricky questions about speech 
limits. As one scholar has noted, giving “[t]oo little protection [to 
machine-generated or machine-facilitated speech] would disserve 
speakers who have evolved beyond the printed pamphlet . . . [while] 
[t]oo much protection would threaten to constitutionalize many areas 
 
174 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (liquor 
price advertising); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417 (1989) (flag burning); 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (graphically violent 
video games); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (data mining). 
175 See Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
176 Id.; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (incitement); Watts v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (true threats).  
177 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1971). 
178 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). 
179 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) 
(strict scrutiny); Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 
(1989) (lesser scrutiny for commercial speech). 
180 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570. 
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of commerce and private concern without promoting the values of the 
First Amendment.”181  
 First Amendment scholar Stuart Minor Benjamin argues that 
algorithmic selection and promotion of specific content tailored to 
specific users is speech under Supreme Court precedent.182 Benjamin 
identifies “two—and only two—elements for First Amendment 
coverage” of digital speech.183 First, that the communications 
platform’s “programmers or operators either create programming or 
choose what to air.”184 And second, “that in doing so they seek to 
communicate messages on a variety of topics.”185 The Supreme Court 
broadly interprets the “message” requirement and has stated that “a 
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection.”186 
While the precise nature of Facebook’s algorithms is a closely 
guarded trade secret, public information shows some of the company’s 
algorithms likely satisfy both elements of Benjamin’s algorithmic 
speech test.187 For example, in early 2018, Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg announced a change to Facebook’s algorithms. Zuckerberg 
said he was “changing the goal I give our product teams from focusing 
on helping you find relevant content to helping you have more 
meaningful social interactions.”188 Facebook would now program its 
algorithms to “prioritize posts that spark conversations and meaningful 
interactions between people,” and “show these posts higher in [the 
user’s] feed.” 189 Prioritized posts would be those “that inspire back-
and-forth discussion in the comments [and those] you might want to 
share and react to.”190 
 
181 Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013). 
182 Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 
1447 (2013) [hereinafter Benjamin, Algorithms]; see also Stuart Minor 
Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining What 
“The Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1695 (2011). 
183 Benjamin, supra note 182, at 1460. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995). 
187 Corporations like Facebook are speakers fully protected by the First 
Amendment. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 
(2010). 
188 Adam Mosseri, Bringing People Closer Together, FACEBOOK BLOG 
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These public statements indicate the company’s algorithms are 
likely to be speech, for two reasons. First, “inspiring back-and-forth 
discussion” is at the heart of the marketplace of ideas and self-
governance theories that guide First Amendment jurisprudence.191 
Next, they show that Facebook’s newsfeed algorithms are selective, 
satisfying the “choose what to air” prong of the first element of 
Benjamin’s speech test. The algorithms analyze user data and, based 
on criteria set by Mark Zuckerberg and implemented by Facebook 
engineers, select which posts a user will see and in what order.192 The 
algorithms also reflect and communicate a pro-community and social 
engagement message, satisfying the test’s second element.  
Benjamin compares this kind of algorithm to a person who 
selects certain news clippings to post on a physical bulletin board.193 
Because the bulletin board reflects its creator’s substantive point of 
view, it is speech.194 Transferring the bulletin board to the internet and 
automating the selection doesn’t change the analysis, because these 
steps change “nothing relevant to free speech coverage under the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.”195 Here, because Zuckerberg’s 
personal decisions to promote or suppress certain content would be 
protected under the First Amendment, Facebook’s algorithms retain 
that protection.196 
Admittedly, less is known about Facebook’s friend suggestion 
algorithm (at issue in Force) than about the newsfeed algorithm 
discussed above.197 It’s possible that the friend suggestion algorithm, 
 
191 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J. 
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
192 As noted above, this article assumes for the sake of argument that the friend 
suggestion algorithm operates as alleged by the plaintiffs in Force. See supra, 
note 18. This subsection’s analysis further assumes for the sake of argument 
that Zuckerberg directs programming goals for the friend suggestion algorithm 
as for the newsfeed algorithm. See supra, notes 188–190 and accompanying 
text.  
193 See Benjamin, supra note 182, at 1465. 
194 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 
195 See Benjamin, supra note 182, at 1465. 
196 See Emily Stewart, Mark Zuckerberg is Essentially Untouchable at 
Facebook, VOX, (Dec 19, 2018, 11:19 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/11/19/18099011/mark-zuckerberg-
facebook-stock-nyt-wsj (Mark Zuckerberg owns 60% of Facebook’s voting 
shares, which makes his decisions there essentially uncheckable). 
197 See Amelia Tait, Why does Facebook Recommend Friends I’ve Never 
Met?, WIRED, (May 29, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/facebook-
people-you-may-know-friend-suggestions; but see, Where do People You may 
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unlike the newsfeed ranking algorithm, might have no basis in 
Facebook’s point of view. It could suggest friends based on non-
ideological factors like geolocation data. If so, the friend suggestion 
algorithm might be regulable commercial conduct, not protected 
speech.198 But if, as the Force plaintiffs allege, the algorithm identifies 
potential Hamas recruits based on shared interests and creates new 
friend suggestions based on that information, the friend suggestion 
algorithm satisfies Benjamin’s test. The friend suggestion algorithm 
“create[s] content” and “select[s] content to present” by taking raw data 
about what users are interested in and generating a friend suggestion 
consisting of a line of text, picture, and link.199 It selects and promotes 
these suggestions to maximize communicative impact. By these 
actions, Facebook communicates a message that more social 
connection is desirable. Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm thus 
passes Benjamin’s test for algorithmic “speech.”  
B. Is algorithmic speech fully protected under the First 
Amendment? 
Assuming, then, that Facebook’s algorithm is speech, is it 
protected by the First Amendment? As discussed above, the Supreme 
Court has expansively defined protected speech. Only a few 
historically bounded categories of speech, like incitement, true threats, 
obscenity, and fighting words, are outside the Amendment’s 
protection.200 While some speech posted by Hamas on Facebook may 
be incitement or true threats, Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm’s 
 
Know Suggestions Come From on Facebook?, FACEBOOK 
https://www.facebook.com/help/163810437015615 (listing factors Facebook 
uses to generate these suggestions). 
198 An example of a commercial conduct algorithm is Amazon’s product 
suggestions. It can be hard for courts to draw the line between regulable 
conduct and speech protected by the First Amendment. Cf. Dana's R.R. Supply 
v. Attorney Gen., Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015) (Florida’s anti-
surcharge law was an impermissible speech regulation) with Rowell v. 
Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 80 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1431 (2017) (Texas’ anti-surcharge law was a conduct 
regulation only incidentally implicating speech). The Supreme Court resolved 
this circuit split in favor of speech. The difference between a conduct 
regulation and a speech regulation is whether they promote communication 
(Facebook) or commerce (Amazon). 
199 See Benjamin, supra note 182, at 1460. 
200 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1971). 
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output is certainly not.201 Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm falls 
into no First Amendment exemption. So, it is protected.202  
Next, it’s possible that Facebook’s algorithm might be 
“commercial speech.” If so, it would receive second class First 
Amendment protection.203 The outer boundaries of commercial speech 
are not firmly established. Core commercial speech “does no more than 
propose a commercial transaction.”204 But speech that mixes pure 
commercial elements like price advertising with non-commercial 
elements like education or editorial material may also be commercial 
speech.205 In determining whether speech is commercial, the Supreme 
Court has considered the function and motivation of the speech as a 
whole. If the speaker’s motivation is largely economic, then that speech 
may be less easily chilled and may therefore need less First 
Amendment protection.206  
Where Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm would land in 
this analysis is a bit unclear. No court has yet decided the issue of 
whether these kinds of algorithms are speech, much less whether such 
algorithms might be entitled to less protection.207 Facebook is free for 
users, so its friend suggestions aren’t proposing a classic paid 
transaction. The suggestions are not exactly ads for any product or 
service provided by Facebook. And the suggestions are strongly related 
to promoting conversation and connection, which are issues of public 
concern at the core of First Amendment rationales. All of these factors 
weigh in favor of full protection for this algorithmic speech. On the 
other hand, Facebook’s friend suggestions do arguably propose a 
commercial transaction central to the social media business model—
that one user “friend” another, on a platform where increased 
 
201 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 47 (1969) (per curiam). 
202 See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19. 
203 See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989) 
(commercial speech regulation must be justified by a “substantial interest;” 
the regulatory means chosen need not be the least restrictive available). 
204 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
205  See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (holding 
that pamphlets which included both general information about contraceptives 
and specific information encouraging customers to purchase them from 
defendant’s drug store were commercial speech). 
206 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 772 (1976) (citing the greater hardiness of commercial speech as a 
rationale for its lower level of protection). 
207 But see Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (holding that censorship algorithm that removed certain search results 
was fully protected speech).  
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connection and engagement means more time spent scrolling and 
increased ad revenue. Facebook’s motivation for urging these 
connections is certainly economic at base. And arguably, there is no 
risk of chilling an algorithm, as it cannot deviate from its 
programming.208 
Further speculation on this fascinating subject is outside the 
scope of this article, but the trend of recent Supreme Court precedent 
is to declare speech “commercial” only when it merely proposes a 
commercial transaction.209 For this reason alone, it’s highly likely that 
Facebook’s algorithmic speech would receive full, non-commercial 
protection, as it also communicates a pro-social message. Assuming 
therefore that this speech would receive full protection under the First 
Amendment, the next section considers constitutional limitations on 
the algorithmic material support claims.  
C. Does the ATA’s material-support prohibition violate the 
First Amendment as applied to Facebook’s friend 
suggestion algorithm? 
Assuming that Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm is fully 
protected speech, the next relevant question is whether the First 
Amendment limits the government’s ability to hold Facebook liable for 
that speech under three provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act: §§ 
2339A, 2339B, and 2333.210 Section 2333 provides a civil cause of 
action to people injured by international terrorist acts. Sections 2339A 
and B criminalize providing material support or resources to terrorists 
and designated foreign terrorist groups. These provisions are not, on 
their face, speech regulations. But, as applied to Facebook’s algorithm, 
the regulations trigger the First Amendment, because where the only 
“conduct” the State seeks to punish “is the fact of communication” the 
regulation is one of speech, not of conduct.211 Furthermore, because 
these provisions bar only speech that materially supports terrorists (and 
not speech that, for example, hinders terrorists), they are “content-
 
208 See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1499 (2013). 
209 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (“While the 
burdened speech results from an economic motive, so too does a great deal of 
vital expression.”). 
210 As discussed previously, plaintiffs bringing secondary-liability material 
support claims under § 2333 must prove a violation under § 2339A or B. See 
supra note 21. 
211 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18. 
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based” speech regulation.212 Such restrictions receive strict scrutiny.213 
Strict scrutiny demands a compelling government interest and that the 
challenged regulation is the most narrowly tailed means of achieving 
that end.214 
The Supreme Court considered an as-applied First Amendment 
challenge to § 2339B in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.215 
Holder involved U.S. citizens who “wished to provide support for the 
political and humanitarian activities” of two groups, the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE).216 Both organizations had been designated by the U.S. 
Secretary of State as “foreign terrorist organizations.”217 The plaintiffs 
wished to support the organizations’ lawful activities by providing 
“legal training, and political advocacy.”218 Because § 2339B 
criminalized providing such support, they could not. The plaintiffs sued 
claiming that § 2339B violated their First Amendment freedom of 
speech by “criminaliz[ing this speech] without requiring the 
Government to prove that plaintiffs had a specific intent to further the 
unlawful ends of those organizations.”219 
The Holder Court rejected the government’s arguments that 
the material support ban regulated only non-expressive conduct or that 
it was a conduct regulation that imposed only incidental burdens on 
speech.220 As applied to the plaintiffs, the law banned 
communications—training and advocacy—in support of the PKK and 
LTTE, acting as a content-based speech restriction. The Court therefore 
employed “rigorous” scrutiny.221 First, the government interest 
asserted—preventing terrorist attacks—was compelling and “an urgent 
 
212 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). 
213 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 804 
(2000). 
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215 Holder, 561 U.S. at 28. 
216 Id. at 9–10. 
217 Id. at 9. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 37. 
220 Holder, 561 U.S. at 27–8. 
221 Id.; see also Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) 
(Roberts, J.) (describing Holder as a strict scrutiny class); but see Alexander 
Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 672–73 
(describing the Court’s characterization of Holder as a strict scrutiny case as 
“lawyerly sleight of hand”). 
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objective of the highest order.”222 The Court next considered whether 
the statute needlessly prohibited speech-based support intended to 
support the organizations’ peaceful activities.223 In a departure from 
ordinary strict scrutiny analysis, the Court deferred to Congress’ 
determination that a ban on speech-based support to the group was 
necessary.224 Given the structural realities of terrorist groups like these, 
plaintiffs’ direct support for peaceful activities indirectly supports the 
groups’ violent activities. Support, the Court emphasized, was 
fungible.225 Given the government’s exceedingly strong interest in 
preventing terror attacks and the special competency of the political 
branches in evaluating the risks involved, § 2339B as applied was 
sufficiently narrow.226  
However, the Holder Court emphasized, its decision did not 
mean “any future applications of the material-support statute to speech 
. . . [would] survive First Amendment scrutiny.”227 “In particular,” the 
Court stated, “we in no way suggest that a regulation of independent 
speech would pass constitutional muster, even if the Government 
[shows] that such speech benefits foreign terrorist organizations.”228 
This caveat is particularly relevant to the claims raised in Force. First, 
the government’s interest in allowing civil suits is less compelling than 
its interest in preventing terror attacks. Second, as applied to 
independent speech like Facebook’s, the statute is not a sufficiently 
tailored means of achieving this interest.  
In the “compelling government interest” prong of the strict 
scrutiny analysis, the Force claims might survive but carry less weight 
than the interest asserted in Holder. The Holder court noted that the 
government’s interest in preventing acts of terrorism was “an urgent 
objective of the highest order.”229 And, in Holder, the government was 
directly asserting that interest through § 2339B.230 In Force, the 
plaintiffs asserted §§ 2339A and B through § 2333, the civil liability 
provision.231 The government’s regulatory interest in Force, therefore, 
 
222 Holder, 561 U.S. at 28; see Tsesis, supra note 221, at 672–73 (arguing that 
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isn’t prevention of terrorist acts, but enabling victims of such attacks to 
find justice. This is probably less compelling than preventing the 
attacks themselves.  
In the “narrowly tailored means” prong of the strict scrutiny 
analysis, the ATA’s material support provisions, as applied to the 
Force plaintiffs’ claims, are unlikely to survive. Facebook’s algorithm 
is independent speech, a restriction of which the Holder Court stated 
was undecided by that opinion and indicated was unlikely to 
succeed.232 The Holder plaintiffs wanted to work directly with the PKK 
and LTTE, training members and advocating on the organization’s 
behalf.233 Facebook, in contrast, is not working with Hamas. It deploys 
its algorithm to increase use of and engagement with its site. Support 
of Hamas is secondary and unintentional.234 If the material support 
statute can criminalize such speech, it is dangerously broad.235   
Of course, there is a legitimate argument for why prohibiting 
civil suits based on independent speech that has the effect of providing 
material support is the most narrowly tailored means available. 
Facebook is arguably a uniquely powerful market force, so its friend 
suggestions may be uniquely effective at providing recruits. Given this, 
civil liability might be a necessary means of forcing Facebook to 
address the problem, given the government’s limited means to do so 
and Facebook’s significant ones. However, this argument will fail. 
When national security is at issue, courts are especially reluctant to 
allow suits that might undercut the effectiveness of executive 
enforcement.236 The government may prefer to shield Facebook from 
liability if terrorist groups that communicate via American technology 
platforms are easier for U.S. intelligence to monitor. Furthermore, 
under strict scrutiny the most narrowly tailored means to achieve the 
government’s interest is required. A statute providing that Facebook 
may be held liable only for material support it intentionally or directly 
provides to Hamas (as, say, a contractor) would be more narrowly 
tailored. Unless the Court finds that Congress had no narrower means 
of effectively preventing a service like Facebook from providing 
material support through its friend suggestion algorithm, the statute 
 
232 Id. at 39 (“In particular, we in no way suggest that a regulation of 
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will not survive means analysis. Considering the Holder Court’s 
concern about allowing Congress to create unbounded liability for 
independent speech that provides support to terrorist organizations, § 
2333 thus applied would be struck down as an impermissible regulation 
of Facebook’s algorithmic speech.  
CONCLUSION 
Algorithmic material support claims like those brought in 
Force are long shots. As currently written and interpreted by a majority 
of courts, § 230(c)(1) provides potent immunity from such claims. 
However, given recent calls to reform Section 230, it is possible that 
this statutory hurdle may be lowered—or removed entirely.237 
Congress has begun considering proposals to reform Section 230.238 
 
237 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020) 
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Attorney General [to] develop a proposal for Federal legislation that would 
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Schiff was continuing to mislead his followers by peddling the long-
disproved Russian Collusion Hoax, and Twitter did not flag those tweets. 
Unsurprisingly, its officer in charge of so-called ‘Site Integrity’ has flaunted 
his political bias in his own tweets.”); see also Kate Conger, Another Tweet 
from Trump Gets a Label from Twitter, N.Y. TIMES, (June 23, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/technology/trump-twitter-label-
seattle.html. However, concerns about § 230(c) and its expansive 
interpretation, and calls for Congress to reconsider its provisions, long pre-
date the current dust up. See OFFICE OF THE ATTY GEN., DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE’S REVIEW OF SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
OF 1996, https://www.justice.gov/ag/department-justice-s-review-section-
230-communications-decency-act-1996 (last accessed June 27, 2020) (noting 
that the Justice Department held a public workshop to discuss the issue of 
Section 230 reforms on February 19, 2020); Rebecca Tushnet, Power 
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Also, the Department of Justice’s Office of the Attorney General 
recently issued a review of Section 230 identifying “areas ripe for 
reform.”239 Among the Department’s recommendations is “exempting 
from immunity specific categories of claims that address particularly 
egregious content, including . . . terrorism.”240 Of course, 
recommendations from the Office of the Attorney General have no 
legal—and possibly no persuasive—effect. But the Department’s 
attention to the possible political or legal desirability of a terrorism 
carve-out shows that government leaders continue to grapple with the 
appropriate balance of legal rights and protections for terror victims 
and valuable, powerful internet companies.  
But even if the statutory hurdle is lowered or removed, material 
support claims based on social media algorithms will remain 
challenging. Assuming Facebook’s algorithm is speech, it’s unlikely 
the Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, would find the material 
support statute’s civil liability provision constitutional as applied to 
claims based on independent speech like this. And the proximate 
causation hurdle presented by the ATA will remain.241  
Notwithstanding these obstacles, understanding the hurdles 
such claimants face is valuable, especially given the current attention 
focused on § 230(c). Understanding exposure under this theory will 
help social media companies assess risk and voluntarily structure their 
activities—algorithmic or otherwise—to minimize liability. 
Understanding the hurdles such claims face can help victims of terrorist 
attacks make informed decisions about which claims to pursue and 
which to forgo. Understanding the complexities of terrorism claims 
against social media companies can inform Congress as it considers 
amending Section 230. And finally, understanding this analytical 
process can help courts considering the tragic claims of terror victim 
plaintiffs navigate the complicated intersecting statutory and 
constitutional legal issues they present.  
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